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    <title>Ipv6 on microsegment.io</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Ipv6 on microsegment.io</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>IPv6 Must Not Bypass Your Containment Policy</title>
      <link>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-11-03-ipv6-must-not-bypass-containment/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;The application server cannot reach the database management interface over IPv4. Good.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Now run the same test over IPv6.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;If the second connection succeeds, the application is not contained. One address family is contained. That distinction belongs in the acceptance criteria, not in a footnote on the network diagram.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This is an implementation review, not a claim about a newly discovered attack campaign. The useful question is simple: does your segmentation intent survive a change of address family?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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