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    <title>Mitre-Attack on microsegment.io</title>
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      <title>What Good L3/L4 Policy Can Actually Do</title>
      <link>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-07-09-what-l3-l4-policy-can-do/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 2019 I published a short article about MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK and segmentation.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The point was simple: when ATT&amp;amp;CK maps adversary techniques to mitigations, network segmentation shows up in more places than many people expect. It is not only a perimeter control. It appears across the attack lifecycle because attackers need reach.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That old point still holds.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;But it deserves a 2026 reassessment.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The original post was written in a world where many segmentation conversations still meant VLANs, firewall zones, and large network boundaries. Today the conversation is broader. We have cloud security groups, Kubernetes network policies, host firewalls, software-defined segmentation, identity-aware access paths, workload labels, service maps, and microsegmentation platforms.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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