<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Monitoring on microsegment.io</title>
    <link>https://microsegment.io/tags/monitoring/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Monitoring on microsegment.io</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://microsegment.io/tags/monitoring/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>GPU Monitoring Needs Its Own Containment Boundary</title>
      <link>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-10-13-gpu-monitoring-needs-containment/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-10-13-gpu-monitoring-needs-containment/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The inference endpoint has authentication. The GPU cluster has tenant boundaries. The monitoring port is reachable from everywhere because someone needed to make the dashboard work.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That is the deployment pattern I would challenge in the next containment review.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Monitoring should be an explicit dependency, not an exception to segmentation.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;h2 id=&#34;what-the-research-actually-shows&#34;&gt;What The Research Actually Shows&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;https://lava.security/research/cve-2026-47483-nvidia-dcgm-exporter-vulnerability&#34;&gt;Lava&amp;rsquo;s October 8 research&lt;/a&gt; reports approximately 2,100 hosts exposing DCGM Exporter telemetry without authentication across four scans between March and May 2026. The responses contained more than 12,000 unique GPU identifiers. Hardware details, utilization and workload labels could expose information about the infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
