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    <title>Network-Segmentation on microsegment.io</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Network-Segmentation on microsegment.io</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>The ATT&amp;CK Segmentation Layer Is Now Updated to v19.1</title>
      <link>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-07-10-attack-v19-1-segmentation-layer/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-07-10-attack-v19-1-segmentation-layer/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&#34;https://microsegment.io/content/Segmentation_as_a_mitigation_in_ATTACK.json&#34;&gt;microsegment.io ATT&amp;amp;CK Navigator layer for Network Segmentation&lt;/a&gt; is now refreshed to MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK v19.1.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This is not a dramatic update in the sense of new colors, new scoring, or a long list of new techniques. The useful part is more boring, and probably more important: the mapping stayed stable. MITRE&amp;rsquo;s current Enterprise ATT&amp;amp;CK data still maps &lt;a href=&#34;https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030/&#34;&gt;M1030 Network Segmentation&lt;/a&gt; to 44 technique and tactic entries across 37 unique technique IDs.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That stability is worth paying attention to. It means the original point from the 2019 ATT&amp;amp;CK segmentation article still holds in 2026: segmentation keeps appearing across the attack lifecycle because attackers need reachability. They need paths to remote services, identity infrastructure, management systems, deployment tooling, configuration stores, command-and-control channels, and exfiltration routes. If those paths are broad, implicit, or poorly governed, the attacker gets options. If those paths are narrow, explicit, and enforced close to the systems that matter, the attacker has fewer moves available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>What Good L3/L4 Policy Can Actually Do</title>
      <link>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-07-09-what-l3-l4-policy-can-do/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://microsegment.io/post/2026-07-09-what-l3-l4-policy-can-do/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 2019 I published a short article about MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK and segmentation.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The point was simple: when ATT&amp;amp;CK maps adversary techniques to mitigations, network segmentation shows up in more places than many people expect. It is not only a perimeter control. It appears across the attack lifecycle because attackers need reach.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;That old point still holds.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;But it deserves a 2026 reassessment.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The original post was written in a world where many segmentation conversations still meant VLANs, firewall zones, and large network boundaries. Today the conversation is broader. We have cloud security groups, Kubernetes network policies, host firewalls, software-defined segmentation, identity-aware access paths, workload labels, service maps, and microsegmentation platforms.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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